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Fair Use and Home Videotape Copying of
Television Broadcasts
Recent technological advances such as photocopiers, home
sound recorders, and now home videotape recorders, raise unan-
swered questions about liability for private copying of copy-
righted material. Assuming an author's copyright prohibits pri-
vate copying,' United States copyright law, designed to protect
authors' and publishers' commercial interests,' is poorly adapted
to protect copyright holders from the private copying these ma-
chines foster. Although detection of infringing works is relatively
easy when a single infringer mass produces and distributes the
copyrighted work, detection of private copying is difficult. Yet,
because private copies satisfy some of the demand for a copied
work, thus reducing the volume of a copyright holder's sales, the
aggregate effect of private copying is potentially as injurious as
mass production and distribution of infringing works.ils comment scusses home videotape recording under
both the 1909 Copyright Act 3 and the new copyright law4 which
1. Private or personal copying or use, as used in this comment, connotes copying by
an individual for his or her own personal use, or use with a small, closed group such as
family and friends. A use is not personal or private if the individual copying the work,
whether for profit or gratuitously, distributes copies or allows an unlimited group to use
the copy. Some writers doubt whether United States copyright law prohibits copying for
personal use. See Shaw, Publication and Distribution of Scientific Literature, 17 COLLEGE
AND RESEARCH LIBRAR 294 (1956); Gosnell, The Viewpoint of the Librarian and Library
User, in COPYRIGHT, CURRENT VIEWPOINTS ON HISTORY, LAWS, LEGISLATION 56, 61 (A. Kent
and H. Lancour eds. 1972). See also Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546 (1973), where,
in dictum, the Court stated:
An author who possesses an unlimited copyright may preclude others from
copying his creation for commercial purposes without permission. In other
words, to encourage people to devote themselves to intellectual and artistic
creation, Congress may guarantee to authors and inventors a reward in the form
of control over the sale or commercial use of copies of their works.
Id. at 555 (emphasis added).
2. Although United States copyright is designed to protect the copyright holder't
commercial interests, its purpose is not to assure the copyright holder's commercial gain.
The Constitution grants Congress the power to pass legislation "[tlo promote the Prog-
ress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors
the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8,
cl. 8.
As the Court stated in Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156
(1975): "The immediate effect of our copyright law is to secure a fair return for an
'author's' creative labor. But the ultimate aim is, by this incentive, to stimulate artistic
creativity for the general public good."
3. 17 U.S.C. §§ 1-216 (1970).
4. Act of Oct. 19, 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541 (to be codified in title 17 of
U.S.C.) [hereinafter cited as 1976 Act].
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becomes effective January 1, 1978. Because home videotaping
violates the copyright holder's exclusive rights to transcribe or
copy the copyrighted program, the comment focuses on the appli-
cation of the fair use doctrine ' to home recording of television
programs. If home videotape recording is not a fair use, individu-
als recording copyrighted television programs are liable for copy-
right infringement; yet, because private copying is difficult to
detect, it may be impossible for copyright holders to protect
themselves from this private copying. The comment, therefore,
discusses the possibility of preventing distribution of home video-
taping machines and concludes by suggesting a change in our
copyright law. Before considering the fair use doctrine, however,
it is helpful to consider American copyright law as it applies to
television broadcasts.
Under the 1909 Act, the United States has a dual system of
common law and statutory copyright, which, although protecting
essentially the same rights,' protects these rights at different
times. Live television broadcasts of uncopyrighted material must
depend on common law copyright,7 which protects the author's
rights from the work's creation until the author permits publica-
tion of the work." All prerecorded programs can receive statutory
5. "Fair use may be defined as the privilege in others than the owner of the copyright,
to use the copyrighted material in a reasonable manner without his consent; notwith-
standing the monopoly granted to the owner by the copyright." H. BALL, THE LAW OF
COPYRIGHTED AND LrIERARY PROPERTY 260 (1944).
6. M. NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 111 (1976) [hereinafter cited as NIMMER];
Solinger, Unauthorized Uses of Television Broadcasts, 48 COLUM. L. REV. 848, 853-54
(1948). See also Palmer v. De Witt, 47 N.Y. 532, 7 Am. Rep. 480 (Ct. App. 1872).
7. See Comment, Copyright Protection for Live Sports Telecasts, 29 BAYLOR L. REV.
101 (1977). Broadcasts themselves are never copyrighted. If the broadcast originated from
copyrighted material, such as a copyrighted script or videotape, statutory copyright pro-
tects the broadcast, but the broadcast itself is not copyrighted. If the underlying material
is not copyrighted, the broadcast receives no statutory protection. Common law copyright
protects broadcasts of material not copyrighted under the copyright statute.
Some writers indicate the fair use doctrine does not apply to works protected by
common law copyright because unlike statutory copyright, common law copyright seeks
to protect the author's privacy as well as his commercial interests. SUBCOMM. ON PATENTS,
TRADEMARKS, AND COPYRIGHTS, SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 86TH CONG., 2D SESS.,
COPYRIGHT REVISION STUDY No. 14, at 7 (Comm. Print 1960) [hereinafter cited as STUDY
No. 141; Cohen, Fair Use in the Law of Copyright, 6 ASCAP COPYRIGHT L. SYMP. 43, 51
(1955) [hereinafter cited as Cohen]. This seems to prevent application of the fair use
doctrine to home videotaping of television broadcasts such as sporting events. One could
argue, however, that the fair use doctrine should apply to home videotaping of television
broadcasts of uncopyrighted material if the videotaping does not injure the author, be-
cause once millions of viewers see the broadcast, the author no longer has a privacy
interest in that work.
8. NIMMER, supra note 6, § 46. See also Kortland v. Bradford, 116 Misc. 664, 190
N.Y.S. 311 (Sup. Ct. 1921). Common law copyright is often referred to as the right of first
publication. NIMMER defines publication:
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copyright protection,9 which generally begins when the author
publishes the work and grants the author a monopoly limited
both in the scope of the rights protected ° and in the duration of
protection.II
The new copyright law nearly abolishes the United States'
dual system of common law and statutory copyright by preempt-
ing all state and common law copyright for any work capable of
obtaining statutory copyright." Under the new law, every work
[P]ublication occurs when by consent of the copyright owner, the original or
tangible copies of a work are sold, leased, loaned, given away, or otherwise made
available to the general public, or when an authorized offer is made to dispose
of the work in any such manner even if a sale or other such disposition does not
occur.
NIMMER, supra note 6, § 49, at 194-95 (emphasis in the original) (footnotes omitted). A.
SEIDEL, WHAT THE GENERAL PRACTITIONER SHOULD KNOW ABOUT TRADEMARKS AND
COPYRIGHTS 113 (2d ed. 1967), also defines publication in terms of distribution of tangible
copies.
Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc. v. Documentaries Unlimited, Inc., 42 Misc. 2d
723, 248 N:V ,.q2d 809 (Sup. Ct. 1964), held that a television hroadcaqt did not divest the
author of common law copyright protection. See also Solinger, Unauthorized Uses of
Television Broadcasts, 48 COLUM. L. REV. 848, 857 (1948); Ferris v. Frohman, 223 U.S. 424
(1912). Although no court has held to the contrary, it is arguable that the tangible copy
distinction should not apply to television broadcasts because to apply it would give the
author the exclusive right to benefit from the work for an unlimited period. Once the
author allows the work to enter the stream of commerce, either by distribution of tangible
copies or by broadcast over the air waves, statutory copyright should govern the author's
rights.
9. Although the courts have never decided whether videotapes may obtain statutory
copyright, the Copyright Office has accepted videotape copies for copyright registration
since 1961, and courts have assumed statutory copyright protection exits. Holland, The
Audiovisual Package: Handle With Care, 22 BuLL. COPYRIGHT SOC'Y 104, 106 (1974); Walt
Disney Prods. v. Alaska Television Network, Inc., 310 F. Supp. 1073 (W.D. Wash. 1969).
See also 37 C.F.R. § 202.15(d) (1976). For an article questioning the constitutionality of
copyright protection for news broadcasts, see Patterson, Private Copyright and Public
Communication: Free Speech Endangered, 28 VAND. L. REv. 1161 (1975).
10. The author's monopoly is limited to the exclusive rights expressed in 17 U.S.C. §
1 (1970). See NIMMER, supra note 6, § 100, at 374.
11. 17 U.S.C. § 24 (1970).
12. The 1976 Act, supra note 4, § 301, preempts all state and common law protection
except for works not copyrightable under § 102 and § 103. Sections 102 and 103 are so
broad that for all practical purposes only those works not fixed in tangible form are subject
to common law protection. See H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 129, reprinted
in [1976] 5 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 5659, 5745.
The 1976 Act, supra note 4, defines a work fixed in tangible form:
A work is "fixed" in a tangible medium of expression when its embodiment
in a copy or phonorecord, by or under the authority of the author, is sufficiently
permanent or stable to permit it to be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise com-
municated for a period of more than transitory duration. A work consisting of
sounds, images, or both, that are being transmitted, is "fixed" for purposes of
this title if a fixation of the work is being made simultaneously with its transmis-
sion.
The 1976 Act, supra note 4, § 101.
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obtains statutory copyright from the moment of its fixation in
tangible form. 3 The new law's definition of fixation includes
those programs which the networks broadcast live while simulta-
neously making a videotape copy.' 4 Because networks videotape
virtually everything they broadcast, the new law protects most
television broadcasts, thereby preempting common law protec-
tion.' 5
Both the 1909 Act and the new copyright law grant the copy-
right holder several exclusive rights." For purposes of home vid-
eotaping of television broadcasts, the right to transcribe 7 under
13. H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 129, reprinted in [1976] 5 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 5659, 5745; Panel Discussion on the New Copyright Law, APLA at 658
(Oct.-Nov. 1976).
14. The 1976 Act, supra note 4, states:
"Audiovisual works" are works that consist of a series of related images
which are intrinsically intended to be shown by the use of machines or devices
such as projectors, viewers, or electronic equipment, together with accompany-
ing sounds, if any, regardless of the nature of the material objects, such as films
or tapes, in which the works are embodied.
A work consisting of sounds, images, or both, that are being transmitted,
is "fixed" for purposes of this title if a fixation of the work is being made
simultaneously with its transmission.
The 1976 Act, supra note 4, § 101.
The 1976 Act, supra note 4, also states:
(a) Copyright protection subsists, in accordance with this title, in original
works of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression, now known or
later developed, from which they can be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise
communicated, either directly or with the aid of a machine or device. Words of
authorship include the following categories:
(6) motion pictures and other audiovisual works.
The 1976 Act, supra note 4, § 102.
Live broadcasts which are not simultaneously taped, because outside the law's scope,
remain subject to common law protection.
15. Preemption of common law protection for television broadcasts eliminates the
possible problem of applying the fair use doctrine to live television broadcasts. Because
the new law protects all broadcasts, the fair use doctrine is potentially applicable in every
instance.
16. The work's nature determines the scope and nature of the rights obtained. See
17 U.S.C. § 1 (1970). For example, the owner of a copyright in a dramatic work has the
exclusive right to perform or present the work publicly, 17 U.S.C. § 1(d) (1970); while the
owner of a copyright in a musical composition has the exclusive right to perform the work
publicly for profit. 17 U.S.C. § 1(e) (1970).
The new law reduces the relationship between the exclusive rights and the nature of
the work by giving all copyright holders essentially the same rights. The rights to perform
the work publicly and to display the work publicly are the only rights directly related to
the work's nature. The 1976 Act, supra note 4, § 106.
17. 17 U.S.C. § 1(c) and (d) (1970). In similar language both sections give the exclu-
sive right "to make or procure the making of any transcription or record thereof by or from
which, in whole or in part, it may in any manner or by any method be exhibited, . or
reproduced."
196 University of Puget Sound Law Review
the 1909 Act and the right to copy'" under the new law are the
most important rights. The respective laws define a transcription
or a copy as any tangible object from which the copyrighted work
may be exhibited, performed, or reproduced. A videotape record-
ing of a copyrighted program infringes the author's exclusive right
to transcribe 9 or to copy20 because the videotape is a tangible
object from which the home viewer, with the aid of a television
and a play back machine, can view the copied program. Users of
home videotape recording machines, therefore, may be liable for
copyright infringement.
Although some writers indicate private use is outside the
scope of statutory copyright,2' an examination of statutory copy-
right's purpose reveals private use may subject the private user
to liability for copyright infringement. The United States Consti-
tution grants Congress the power to create statutory copyright to
encourage the creation and spread of ideas for the public benefit. 22
Congress designed statutory copyright to ensure authors full fin-
ancial benefit from the creation and distribution of their works,
thereby encouraging authors to create and share their ideas. 23
Whether one individual copies a work and distributes 10,000 cop-
ies to individual users or whether 10,000 individuals copy the
18. The 1976 Act, supra note 4, § 106(1), gives copyright holders the exclusive right
to copy. The 1976 Act, supra note 4, § 101, defines copies: .'Copies' are material objects,
other than phonorecords, in which a work is fixed by any method now known or later
developed, and from which the work can be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communi-
cated, either directly or with the aid of a machine or device."
19. Walt Disney Prods. v. Alaska Television Network, Inc., 310 F. Supp. 1073 (W.D.
Wash. 1969), held that a videotape copy of network broadcasts violated the exclusive right
to transcribe. Avideotape recording infringes the author's common law copyright because
the rights protected are essentially the same as the rights conferred by statutory copyright.
See note 6 supra.
20. Any videotape copy infringes the copyright owner's exclusive right to copy. See
note 18 supra.
21. See note 1 supra. Other writers, however, indicate that although private copying
is within the scope of statutory copyright, private copying is always fair use. Cohen, supra
note 7, at 58; E. KITCH & H. PERLMAN, LEGAL REGULATION OF THE COMPETITIVE PROCESS 909
(1972). Contra, Nimmer, New Technology and the Law of Copyright: Reprography and
Computers, 15 U.C.L.A. L. Rxv. 931, 950-52 (1968); STUDY No. 14, supra note 7, at 12.
Other writers, though admitting an individual's hand copying constitutes fair use, state
that machine copying for personal use does not constitute fair use. B. KAPLAN, AN UNHUR-
RIED VIEW OF COPYRIGHT 101-02 (1967); Goldman, Copyright as it Affects Libraries: Legal
Implications, in COPYRIGHT, CURRENT VIEWPOINTS ON HISTORY, LAWS, LEGISLATION 30, 40
(A. Kent and H. Lancour eds. 1972). Contra, W. NASRI, CRISIS IN COPYRIGHT 88-90 (1976),
where the author states if personal use is fair use, the method of reproduction is immater-
ial.
22. See note 2 supra.
23. Patterson, supra note 9, at '1168; Meyer, TV Cassettes-A New Frontier for
Pioneers and Pirates, 19 BULL. COPYRIGHT Soc'Y 16, 47 (1971).
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work independently for their own use, the copyright holder's po-
tential sales decrease by 10,000. A decrease in sales might deter
authors from creating and sharing their ideas. To achieve its pur-
pose, statutory copyright must prohibit private as well as com-
mercial uses of copyrighted works which unnecessarily deter au-
thors from creating and publishing their ideas.
To protect authors, the 1909 Act on its face gives the copy-
right holder the exclusive right to copy or reproduce any portion
of the protected work. 4 Although substantial similarity and ac-
cess to the copyrighted work are often used to show that the
defendant copied plaintiff's work, 5 courts also have interpreted
the 1909 Act as imposing liability for infringement only if the
derivative work is substantially similar to the protected work.2 1
A derivative work is substantially similar if it contains a substan-
tial quantity of the copied work, or if it contains any of the copy-
righted work's important or essential material.27 Limiting the use
of an earlier work to its unimportant or nonessential parts, how-
ever, reduces the effectiveness of criticisms and interferes with
the improvement and development of the ideas contained in the
earlier work. Because strict adherence to the copyright statute
would impede the development and spread of ideas by severely
limiting the use of earlier works, courts developed the equitable
doctrine of fair use to balance the public's interest in the develop-
ment and distribution of ideas against the author's interest in his
limited monopoly. 28
Although courts agree a finding of fair use relieves the user
from liability for copyright infringement, commentators disagree
on whether a finding of fair use excuses the individual's infringe-
24. Title 17, U.S.C., § 1(a) (1970), gives the copyright holder the exclusive right to
copy the protected work and does not qualify or limit the right in any way.
25. NIMMER, supra note 6, § 141.2.
26. See Caddy-Imler Creations, Inc. v. Caddy, 299 F.2d 79, 82 (9th Cir. 1962). See
also Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464 (2d Cir. 1946), where the court stated that liability
for copyright infringement requires a showing of copying and that the material copied
constituted an improper appropriation. Id. at 468. The court recognized there can be
permissible copying. Id. at 472. In this case where the plaintiff alleged the defendant
copied part of plaintiff's musical composition, the question was whether the defendant
took a part of plaintiff's work which was pleasing to those hearing it. Id. at 473. See also
NIMMER, supra note 6, § 143.1. But see Henry Holt & Co. v. Ligget & Myers Tobacco Co.,
23 F. Supp. 302, 303 (E.D. Pa. 1938).
27. NIMMER, supra note 6, § 143.12, at 629-30.
28. Casson, Fair Use: The Advisability of Statutory Enactment, 13 IDEA 240, 241
(1969); W. NAsRI, CRIsIs IN COPYRIGHT 29 (1976). Accord, Berlin v. E.C. Publications, Inc.,
329 F.2d 541, 543-44 (2d Cir. 1964); Greenbie v. Noble, 151 F. Supp. 45, 67 (S.D.N.Y.
1957).
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ment 2l or limits the copyright holder's exclusive rights, thus mak-
ing the individual's use noninfringing.3 0 Under the 1909 Act, com-
mentators could debate the nature of fair use because the Act did
not specifically recognize the doctrine. The new law settles the
disagreement by expressly recognizing the fair use doctrine as a
limitation on the copyright holder's exclusive rights."
In certain instances, fair use allows reasonable uses of copy-
righted works without the copyright holder's consent.32 The new
law codifies the four factors courts generally consider in determin-
ing fair use.3 The factors are: (1) the effect of the use on the
copyrighted work's value; (2) the nature of the use; (3) the
amount of the copyrighted work used; and (4) the nature of the
copyrighted work. Although courts consider all four factors in
deciding if a particular use is a fair use, the effect and nature of
the use are the crucial factors. Courts must carefully balance
these two factors to maximize the creation and spread of ideas,
thereby achieving statutory copyright's purpose. Authors may
refrain from publishing their creations if courts allow uses which
29. Pforzheimer, Historical Perspective on Copyright Law and Fair Use, in
TECHNOLOGY AND COPYIGHT 269, 281 (G. Bush ed. 1972), defines fair use as a taking so
insubstantial as not to infringe the copyright. See also Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342,
348 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841) (No. 4,901).
30. Nimmm, supra note 6, § 145, at 644-45.
31. The 1976 Act, supra note 4, states:
Notwithstanding the provisions of section 106, the fair use of a copyrighted
work, including such use by reproduction in copies or phonorecords or by any
means specified by that section, for purposes such as criticism, comment, news
reporting, teaching . . . . scholarship, or research, is not an infringement of
copyright. In determining whether the use made of a work in any particular case
is a fair use the factors to be considered shall include-
(1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether such use
is of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes;
(2) the nature of the copyrighted work;
(3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to
the copyrighted work as a whole; and
(4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the
copyrighted work.
The 1976 Act, supra note 4, § 107.
Section 106 of the 1976 Act, supra note 4, gives copyright holders their exclusive
rights, but expressly subjects those rights to the fair use limitation of § 107.
Congress did not intend the doctrine's codification to alter the courts' application of
the doctrine. H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 65-66, reprinted in 119761 5
U.S. CODE CONG. & AD NEws 5659, 5679-80.
32. See note 5 supra.
33. See Williams & Wilkins Co. v. United States, 487 F.2d 1345, 1352 (Ct. Cl. 1973),
aff'd without opinion by an equally divided Court, 420 U.S. 376 (1975).
Fair use is a question of fact requiring consideration of all relevant factors; no single
factor is determinative. See Mathews Conveyer Co. v. Palmer-Bee Co., 135 F.2d 73, 85
(6th Cir. 1943); Karll v. Curtis Publishing Co., 39 F. Supp. 836, 837 (E.D. Wis. 1941).
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economically injure copyright holders.3' Yet, uses of copyrighted
works which benefit society by distributing useful ideas may jus-
tify tolerating some harm to the copyright holder." The initial
consideration, therefore, should be the nature of the use .3 The
greater the societal benefits of a use, the more tolerant courts
should be of some harm to the copyright holder because the use
may benefit society more than the possible detriment to society
incurred by allowing injury to the copyright holder. 7 When the
use has little societal benefit, however, courts should not risk
possible deterrence of other authors by allowing the use to con-
tinue if it injures the copyright holder.8
There are two factors to consider when examining the nature
of the use. First is the commercial versus the scholarly or artistic
elements of the use. 3' Although nearly all uses contain both of
these elements,4' some uses are obviously primarily commercial,
such as advertisements, or primarily scholarly or artistic, such as
scientific, historical, or educational uses. A commercial use pos-
sessing little value as a distributor of useful ideas will be difficult
to justify as a fair use." A use, whether or not motivated by a
34. Statutory copyright's assurance of full financial benefit from the copyrighted
work encourages authors and publishers to share their ideas with society. Without such
assurance, authors may not devote time to create valuable works because others could
appropriate and benefit from the authors' labors. Publishers may not invest the time and
money in editing and typesetting a work which another publisher may steal, thereby
avoiding many initial costs and enabling the thief to undersell the original publisher. If
the defendant's use substantially injures the copyright holder's financial interests, there-
fore, courts generally find the rise unfair. Cohen, supra note 7, at 62. Accord, Folsom v.
Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342, 348 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841) (No. 4,901); Lawrence v. Dana, 15 F. Cas.
26, 61 (C.C.D. Mass. 1869) (No. 8,136).
35. See Berlin v. E.C. Publications, Inc., 329 F.2d 541, 544 (2d Cir. 1964), where the
court stated: "[Clourts in passing upon particular claims of infringement must occasion-
ally subordinate the copyright holder's interest in a maximum financial return to the
greater public interest in the development of art, science and industry."
36. Rosemont Enterprises, Inc. v. Random House, Inc., 366 F.2d 303, 307 (2d Cir.
1966).
37. Pforzheimer, supra note 29, at 282; SUBCOMM. ON PATENTS, TRADEMARKS, AND
COPYRIGHTS, SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 86TH CONG., 2D SEss., STUDY No. 15 (Comm.
Print 1960) [hereinafter cited as STUDY No. 15). See also Cohen, supra note 7, at 49.
38. See Leon v. Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co., 91 F.2d 484 (9th Cir. 1937); Marvin Worth
Prods. v. Superior Films Corp., 319 F. Supp. 1269 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
39. Williams & Wilkins Co. v. United States, 487 F.2d 1345,1354 (Ct. Cl. 1973), aff'd
without opinion by an equally divided Court, 420 U.S. 376 (1975).
40. Note, Parody and Copyright Infringement, 56 COLUM. L. REv. 585, 597 (1956).
41. See Henry Holt & Co. v. Ligget & Myers Tobacco Co., 23 F. Supp. 302 (E.D. Pa.
1938), where fair use did not protect from liability a defendant who used three lines from
the plaintiff's book in its advertisement.
Commercial uses of little scholarly or artistic benefit are also disfavored because they
will likely compete directly with the original work, creating a greater risk of economic
injury to the copyright holder. Note, Parody and Copyright Infringement, 56 COLUM. L.
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desire for commercial gain, containing useful information will be
easier to justify as a fair use.4" The second factor is whether the
copier plans to distribute multiple copies of the work or otherwise
allow others to use the copy, or whether the copier plans to keep
the copy for his or her own personal use. Noncommercial, private
uses of copyrighted works differ in two respects from commercial
uses where the copier allows others to use the copy. First, unlike
commercial use, private use does not compete on the open market
with the original work. A noncommercial use is therefore less
likely to injure the copyright holder's financial interests than a
commercial use.43 Secondly, because it is not generally dissemi-
nated, a private use does not distribute useful information to
society.
The final two factors courts consider in deciding whether a
use is fair, the copied work's nature and the amount of the origi-
nal work used, are important primarily in relation to the effect
of the use on the copyrighted work's economic value.44 The nature
of the copied work indicates the likely effect of the use on the
original work because copies injure the value of some works more
than others. 5 The amount of the copied work used also affects the
original work's economic value because as the quantity taken
from the original work increases, the new work becomes a better
substitute for the original."
In applying the four enumerated factors to home videotaping
of television broadcasts, one possible obstacle to finding it a fair
REV. 585, 596-97 (1956). See also Marvin Worth Prods. v. Superior Films Corp., 319 F.
Supp. 1269, 1274 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
42. See Rosemont Enterprises, Inc. v. Random House, Inc., 366 F.2d 303, 309 (2d Cir.
1966); Williams & Wilkins Co. v. United States, 487 F.2d 1345 (Ct. Cl. 1973), aff'd without
opinion by an equally divided Court, 420 U.S. 376 (1975). Additionally, creation of the
most beneficial works, such as scientific, historical, or other research works, often necessi-
tates the use of earlier works on the same subject, thereby making such use easier to
justify. 51 TEx. L. REv. 137, 143 (1972).
43. Note, Parody and Copyright Infringement, 56 COLUM. L. REV. 585, 597 (1956).
Although private use may injure the copyright holder, an individual who copies a work,
then distributes copies to the public is likely to inflict greater injury upon the copyright
holder because people who otherwise might buy the original work might buy the copy.
44. STuDy No. 15, supra note 37, at 50-51. Pforzheimer, supra note 29, at 281.
45. Courts also consider the copied work's nature in relation to the defendant's use.
It is generally easier to justify using the copyright holder's scientific, historical, or educa-
tional work. Goldman, supra note 21, at 40. Williams & Wilkins Co. v. United States, 487
F.2d 1345, 1352-53 (Ct. Cl. 1973), aff'd without opinion by an equally divided Court, 420
U.S. 376 (1975).
46. Hill v. Whalen & Martell, Inc., 220 F. 359, 360 (S.D.N.Y. 1914): "One test which,
when applicable, would seem to be ordinarily decisive, is whether or not so much as has
been reproduced as will materially reduce the demand for the original." Accord, 27 WASH.
U.L.Q. 127, 129 (1941).
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use is that viewers will likely record entire programs. Although
courts often state substantial or complete taking is never fair
use,47 the reader must remember no court has considered a private
user's liability for copyright infringement. 8 When the user dis-
tributes a complete or substantial copy of the original work, great
potential for economic harm to the copyright holder exists be-
cause the copy satisfies some of the demand for the original."
When the user, such as the viewer videotaping a television broad-
cast for his own use, does not distribute his complete copy of the
original work, the potential for economic harm to the copyright
holder decreases, reducing the importance of the quantity copied
or used. 0 That the viewer likely will record the entire program
should not, therefore, by itself, bar a finding of fair use."
Because home videotaping possesses no significant societal
benefits as a scholarly or artistic use, it is fair use only if it does
not harm the copyright holder's financial interests.52 Because vi-
deotape copies are for personal use and are not disseminated,
home videotaping does not distribute useful ideas to society's
benefit. At the most, home videotaping allows individuals to view
scholarly or artistic programs they otherwise might miss. The
effect of allowing complete copying of scholarly or artistic works
under the fair use doctrine is to eliminate statutory copyright
protection for these works. This elimination would severely injure
authors of scholarly or artistic works and deter other authors from
expending their efforts in creating similar works, thereby defeat-
ing statutory copyright's purpose of encouraging the creation and
distribution of beneficial works. 3 This result is diametrical to the
47. Public Affairs Assocs., Inc. v. Rickover, 284 F.2d 262, 272 (D.C. Cir. 1960),
vacated per curiam for insufficient record, 369 U.S. 111 (1962); Leon v. Pacific Tel. & Tel.
Co., 91 F.2d 484, 486 (9th Cir. 1937).
48. STUDY No. 14, supra note 7, at 11-12.
49. See 15 S. CAL. L. REv. 249, 250-51 (1942).
50. Williams & Wilkins Co. v. United States, 487 F.2d 1345,1353 (Ct. Cl. 1973), aff'd
without opinion by an equally divided Court, 420 U.S. 376 (1975). See also Needham,
Tape Recording, Photocopying, and Fair Use, 10 ASCAP COPYRIGHT L. Symp. 75, 84-86
(1959).
51. See note 46 supra. Needham, supra note 50, at 86, states: "In the ordinary case
it would seem unimportant whether the user's work could substitute for the author's, if it
was not going to be circulated generally." (Footnote omitted.)
Although the number of copies does not affect the question of infringement, it may
affect the question of fair use. Needham, supra note 50, at 94.
52. See 51 TEX. L. Ray. 137, 142-43 (1972), which recognizes that when defendant's
use competes with plaintiff's work, and neither defendant's nor plaintiff's work is a scien-
tific, historical, educational, or other scholarly research use or work, the effect on the
plaintiff's work's value is the most important factor in determining fair use.
53. See note 2 supra.
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fair use doctrine's goal of furthering statutory copyright's pur-
pose. 4 Complete copying, therefore, will not receive deferential
treatment merely because the copied work is scholarly or artis-
tic;s5 the favored treatment given scholarly or artistic uses con-
templates the expansion and improvement of the copyrighted
work's ideas. Unless a home videotape copy contains a scholarly
or artistic mixture of the copied program and other material, the
copy is not a scholarly or artistic use.
In considering the nature of the copied work, one should
notice that copyrighted television programs differ in two respects
from most other copyrighted works. First, networks broadcast
programs free of charge. Instead of viewers paying the networks
for programs they watch, advertisers pay the networks a desig-
nated rate per thousand viewers per minute of air time used.56
The number of viewers watching a program, therefore, deter-
mines the network's and ultimately the copyright holder's57 finan-
cial return." Secondly, broadcasts are temporary. Unless the
viewer preserves the broadcast by recording it, he must watch the
program when the network shows it. Recording a broadcast in-
creases its audience by allowing persons unable to view the pro-
gram when first shown to view the program and accompanying
advertisements later, and also by allowing multiple viewings of a
single broadcast, thereby increasing the financial return for that
broadcast.5"
Although home videotaping of television broadcasts may ac-
tually increase the copyright holder's return for the copied broad-
cast, home videotaping also may injure the copyright holder's
financial interests in two ways. Because a viewer possessing a
videotape copy of a program is less likely to view subsequent
broadcasts of that program, home videotaping reduces the copy-
right holder's financial return from subsequent broadcasts of the
program. Additionally, development of home videotape systems
allows copyright holders to sell videotape cassettes of their pro-
54. See text accompanying notes 33 and 34 supra.
55. Rosemont Enterprises, Inc. v. Random House, Inc., 366 F.2d 303, 310 (2d Cir.
1966); Needham, supra note 50, at 90.
56. B. OWEN, TELEVISION ECONOMICS 4, 41 (1974).
57. Id. at 38-39.
58. Id. at 18.
59. This statement assumes networks and advertisers will perceive the increased
audience. This assumption is reasonable in light of the modern sampling techniques used
to determine audience size. Knowledge of the number of machines on the market and the
program's popularity among the viewing public should indicate how many viewers are
taping the program.
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grams on the retail market much the same as music companies
sell their product. A home viewer possessing a home-made video-
tape copy of a program is less likely to purchase a videotape
cassette of that program from the copyright holder.'"
In deciding whether home videotaping of copyrighted pro-
grams is fair use, the crucial factor is the nature of the copied
program because the program's nature determines the economic
effect of videotaping." The majority of televised programs, such
as dramatic, comedy, or variety series and specials, news com-
mentaries, game shows, movies, talk or interview programs, and
certain special or championship sporting events, possess some
economic value after their initial broadcast because a substantial
number of those viewing the first broadcast would watch the
program again. Although the rerun or resale values of these var-
ious programs differ, an individual possessing a copy of any pro-
gram is less likely to watch that program when it is broadcast
again. Home videotaping of these programs, therefore, injures the
copyright holder's financial interests by reducing the program's
rerun audience and the potential retail market for videotape cas-
settes of the program.2 To avoid the possibility of deterring the
creation and broadcast of useful and entertaining television pro-
grams, courts should not allow home videotaping of rerunable,
resalable programs under the fair use doctrine." A limited num-
60. In determining fair use, it is immaterial that copyright holders have not yet
marketed videotape cassettes of television programs. A use is not fair if it reduces the
potential value of any of the copyright holder's rights, even if the copyright holder has
not yet exercised the affected right. NIMMER, supra note 6, § 145, at 646-47.
61. Meyer, supra note 23, at 37-38, suggests consideration of the copied work's nature
bars a finding of fair use in home videotaping of network broadcasts because recording
will concentrate on the programs most adversely affected: specials, movies, and series. To
bar all television recording because it adversely affects certain programs, however, totally
disregards consideration of the copied work's nature.
62. Although home videotaping also benefits the copyright holder's financial interests
by increasing the original broadcast's audience, see text accompanying notes 56-59 supra,
the reduction in the potential retail sales market will bar a finding of fair use; the benefi-
cial and detrimental effects cannot be balanced. Title 17, U.S.C., § 1(c) and (d) (1970),
and § 106(4) of the 1976 Act, supra note 4, give the exclusive right to perform the copy-
righted work. Home videotaping may increase the value of this exclusive right by increas-
ing the original broadcast's audience. Title 17, U.S.C., § 1(a) (1970), and § 106(3) of the
1976 Act, supra note 4, give the copyright holder the exclusive right to vend the copy-
righted work. Home videotaping decreases the value of this exclusive right by decreasing
the potential retail market for videotape cassettes of the program. Because home videotap-
ing decreases the value of the copyright holder's right to vend, the benefit to the copyright
holder's right to perform is immaterial. If the use does not merit the tolerance of some
harm to the copyright holder, a reduction in the economic value of any right bars a finding
of fair use. NIMMER, supra note 6, § 145, at 646-47.
63. Addressing the similar problem of home tape recording of copyrighted material
from the radio, Needham feels the listener is not liable for copyright infringement if the
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ber of programs, however, principally news and sports broadcasts,
possess little or no economic value after their initial broadcast 4
because they primarily convey information to the viewers, who
ordinarily have no desire to receive such information twice. 5
Home videotaping of these broadcasts does not injure the copy-
right holder's financial interests." Because home videotaping of
these programs does not harm the copyright holder, there is no
risk that home videotaping will deter the creation and distribu-
tion of these programs. The fair use doctrine, therefore, permits
home videotape copying of news and most sports broadcasts.
Although viewers videotaping copyrighted television pro-
grams are liable for copyright infringement in most instances, as
a practical matter, preventing unfair home videotaping, while
permitting fair use, is difficult. Copyright holders are responsible
for protecting their rights. Without the movement of infringing
works on the open market, identifying a particular individual as
an infringer is very difficult. Both the 1909 Act 7 and the new law 8
provide remedies including injunctions prohibiting infringement,
minimum statutory damages of $250, and destruction of infring-
ing copies. Unless the copyright holder can prove an individual
infringed the holder's copyright, however, the remedies are of
tapes are not generally disseminated. The copyright holder's remedy is to charge the
broadcaster more for the use of the copyrighted work. Needham, supra note 50, at 101.
64. Any rerun value of a news or sports broadcast stems from those viewers who did
not see the original broadcast. Because viewers generally watch these programs only once,
home videotaping increases the first run audience to the same extent it decreases the rerun
audience.
Assuming news and sports programs possess no retail sales value, the copyright
holder's only valuable right is the right to perform or broadcast the program. Home
videotaping's effect on the value of the performance right can only be determined by
determining the overall effect of such videotaping. Determining the overall effect requires
a balancing of the original broadcast's increased audience with the subsequent broadcast's
decreased audience.
65. Although sports broadcasts convey more than just information, their primary
appeal stems from viewing the competitive activity leading to an unknown ending. Unless
the event is particularly exciting or important, most viewers would not care to see the
entire sporting event a second time.
66. Copyright holders sometimes combine the particularly exciting or comical seg-
ments of news or sports broadcasts to form a new and financially valuable program. Home
videotaping of the original broadcasts from which the new program is made should not
injure the new work's value because a collection of videotapes containing all the programs
from which the copyright holder made the new program is a poor substitute for the new
program itself. The new program's informative or entertaining quality stems from the
copyright holder's creative editing of the original programs and narrating of the new
program.
67. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1970).
68. 1976 Act, supra note 4, §§ 502, 503, and 504.
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little value."9
Copyright holders might more effectively protect their inter-
ests by proving manufacturers and distributors of home videotape
recording systems are liable for copyright infringement as second-
ary actors.7" This would allow the copyright holders to pursue
their remedies against a small, identifiable group. Forcing de-
struction of infringing copies would not be an effective remedy
against the manufacturers or distributors because they possess no
infringing copies. Recovery of actual damages,7' however, would
protect copyright holders from home videotaping, as would pre-
venting distribution of home videotape recording systems.72
Absent an employment or lease relationship,73 courts have
imposed vicarious liability primarily where the secondary actor
had both a financial interest in the infringement and control over
the principal actor's activity.74 Thus, in Elektra Records Co. v.
Gem Electronics Distributors, Inc.,75 the federal district court
granted the plaintiff a preliminary injunction prohibiting defen-
dant record store's use of its self-service sound recording machine.
The record store charged customers fifty cents to use the ma-
chine, loaned customers copyrighted musical tapes from which to
record, and sold blank tapes. In Davis v. E.I DuPont de Nemours
& Co.,7" the defendant sponsored a television program bearing its
name. The defendant had to approve several steps in the produc-
tion process, including selection of the work, before production
69. The fact that record companies have not used these remedies against individual
infringers of copyrighted records suggests the remedies may not be effective.
70. NIMMER, supra note 6, § 134.1, at 583.
71. 17 U.S.C. § 101(b) (1970); 1976 Act, supra note 4, § 504(a)(1).
72. Preventing distribution of the machines probably would be the most effective
remedy. Collection of damages would require periodic court action, while copyright hold-
ers could permanently enjoin distribution of the machines in a single action.
73. Many cases of vicarious liability for copyright infringement rest on grounds of
respondeat superior. The most noted of these are the dance hall cases where a band's
employer is held liable for the band's infringement. See Bourne v. Fouche, 238 F. Supp.
745 (E.D.S.C. 1965); Shapiro, Bernstein & Co. v. Veltin, 47 F. Supp. 648 (W.D. La. 1942).
74. See Shapiro, Bernstein & Co. v. H.L. Green Co., 316 F.2d 304, 307 (2d Cir. 1963),
where the court states:
When the right and ability to supervise coalesce with an obvious and direct
financial interest in the exploitation of copyrighted materials-even in the ab-
sence of actual knowledge that the copyright monopoly is being impaired . . .
the purposes of copyright law may be best effectuated by the imposition of
liability upon the beneficiary of that exploitation.
Accord, Rexnord, Inc. v. Modern Handling Sys., Inc., 379 F. Supp. 1190 (D. Del. 1974);
Gershwin Publishing Corp. v. Columbia Artists Management, Inc., 312 F. Supp. 581
(S.D.N.Y. 1970), aff'd, 443 F.2d 1159 (2d Cir. 1971).
75. 360 F. Supp. 821 (E.D.N.Y. 1973).
76. 240 F. Supp. 612 (S.D.N.Y. 1965).
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began. The federal district court found the defendant liable be-
cause the sponsor had control over the program's content and
benefited from the infringing broadcast.77
With one exception,7" if no employment or lease relationship
exists, courts have not found secondary actors liable for infringe-
ment where either a financial benefit in the principal's infringe-
ment, or control over the principal's actions is absent. In Roy
Export Co. Establishment v. Trustees of Columbia University,7"
the federal district court refused to find the University liable even
though it furnished a student organization projection equipment
knowing the students would use it to infringe plaintiff's copy-
right, and even though the University had the ability to prevent
the infringement, because the University received no financial
benefit from the infringement. Another court refused to find a
television broadcast's sponsor liable for the station's infringement
of plaintiffs copyrighted movie although the sponsor benefited
from sponsoring the broadcast and knew of its infringing nature
because the sponsor had no control over the broadcast's con-
tents.'"
In Screen Gems-Columbia Music, Inc. v. Mark-Fi Records,
Inc.,"' a case contrary to the predominant view, the principal
infringer manufactured and sold bootleg record albums. The de-
fendant advertising agency had no control over the principal's
actions. The federal district court, nevertheless, found the agency
liable for copyright infringement because the album had such a
low selling price the agency knew or should have known of the
album's infringing nature. Because of the fly-by-night nature of
the bootleggers themselves, the court expressed concern this
might be plaintiff's only effective means of combating the serious
problem of record piracy. 2
Because neither a lease nor employment relationship exists
between the videotape recording machine manufacturers and the
home user, under the predominant line of cases, manufacturers
are liable only if they benefit financially from the user's infringe-
77. Id. at 631-32.
78. Screen Gems-Columbia Music, Inc. v. Mark-Fi Records, Inc., 327 F. Supp. 788
(S.D.N.Y. 1971), rev'd on other grounds, 453 F.2d 552 (2d Cir. 1972).
79. 344 F. Supp. 1350 (S.D.N.Y. 1972).
80. Rohauer v. Killiam Shows, Inc., 379 F. Supp. 723 (S.D.N.Y. 1974). See also
Robert Stigwood Group Ltd. v. Hurwitz, 462 F.2d 910 (2d Cir. 1972).
81. 327 F. Supp. 788 (S.D.N.Y. 1971), rev'd on other grounds, 453 F.2d 552 (2d Cir.
1972).
82. Judge Weinfeld expressed this concern in denying the defendant's motions for
summary judgment. 256 F. Supp. 399, 404 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).
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ment and have control over the home user's copying. Although
manufacturers do not directly benefit from the home user's in-
fringement in the sense that each infringement results in a calcul-
able benefit,83 the home user's infringement does benefit the man-
ufacturers indirectly. Many people undoubtedly purchase home
videotaping systems to record and preserve popular programs and
movies in violation of the holder's copyright. 4 Sales of home vi-
deotaping systems to these users financially benefit the home
videotape machines' manufacturers. Although machine manu-
facturers benefit indirectly from the user's infringement, manu-
facturers cannot control the home user's use of the machines.
Manufacturers could, however, prevent the home user's infringe-
ment by removing their machines from the market. Under the
predominant line of cases, in finding secondary actors liable for
copyright infringement, courts indicate the secondary actors'
ability to control the principals' actions is the important factor. 5
Courts have refused to find secondary actors liable because the
actors lacked control over the principals' actions even though the
principals' infringements would not have occurred as they did
without the secondary actors' aid." The manufacturers' power to
prevent the home user's infringement by removing their machines
from the market, therefore, is insufficient to support a finding of
vicarious liability.
Although manufacturers of home videotaping systems may
escape liability for copyright infringement under the predomi-
nant line of cases, manufacturers may be liable for infringement
under the reasoning of Screen Gems-Columbia Music, Inc., 7 be-
83. In Shapiro, Bernstein & Co. v. H.L. Green Co., 316 F.2d 304 (2d Cir. 1963), and
Elektra Records Co. v. Gem Electronic Distribs., Inc., 360 F. Supp. 821 (E.D.N.Y. 1973),
the secondary actors benefited directly from the principal's infringement in that they
received either a percentage of the principal's income from each infringement or a set sum
for each infringement. Such a direct financial benefit, however, is not necessary to find
the secondary actor liable for the principal's infringement, provided the secondary actor
has control over the principal's actions. See Rexnord, Inc. v. Modern Handling Sys., Inc.,
370 F. Supp. 1190 (D. Del. 1974); Gershwin Publishing Corp. v. Columbia Artists Manage-
ment, Inc., 312 F. Supp. 581 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), af'd, 443 F.2d 1159 (2d Cir. 1971); Davis
v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 240 F. Supp. 612 (S.D.N.Y. 1965).
84. See text accompanying notes 61-63 supra.
85. Shapiro, Bernstein & Co. v. H.L. Green Co., 316 F.2d 304, 308 (2d Cir. 1963);
Rexnord, Inc. v. Modern Handling Sys., Inc., 379 F. Supp. 1190, 1196 (D. Del. 1974);
Gershwin Publishing Corp. v. Columbia Artists Management, Inc., 312 F. Supp. 581, 583
(S.D.N.Y. 1970), aff'd, 443 F.2d 1159 (2d Cir. 1971); Davis v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours &
Co., 240 F. Supp. 612, 631 (S.D.N.Y. 1965).
86. Robert Stigwood Group Ltd. v. Hurwitz, 462 F.2d 910 (2d Cir. 1972); Rohauer v.
Killiam Shows, Inc., 379 F. Supp. 723 (S.D.N.Y. 1974).
87. 327 F. Supp. 788 (S.D.N.Y. 1971), rev'd on other grounds, 453 F.2d 552 (2d Cir.
1972).
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cause they knowingly aid the principal infringer and reap finan-
cial benefit by supplying videotape machines. The manufactur-
ers' position in home videotaping of copyrighted programs is simi-
lar to the defendant's position in Screen Gems-Columbia Music,
Inc. in that the copyright holder's most effective remedy is to sue
the secondary party. Unlike the advertising agency in Screen
Gems-Columbia Music, Inc., however, manufacturers do not deal
with a single individual they know is infringing the plaintiff's
copyright. The manufacturers are merely selling their machines
to purchasers, some of whom the manufacturers know or should
know will use the machines in an infringing manner. Manufactur-
ers, therefore, are liable for copyright infringement only if sale of
a product capable of use in an infringing manner to persons, some
of whom the manufacturers know or should know will use the
product in an infringing manner, is enough to impose vicarious
liability for copyright infringement.
Although case authority directly on point is scant, existing
authority indicates secondary actors are liable for copyright in-
fringement resulting from their sale of noninfringing products
only if they encourage or intend the purchasers to use the product
in an infringing manner. 88 The United States Supreme Court has
indicated on two occasions that "mere indifferent supposition or
knowledge on the part of the seller" may not be enough to impose
liability for the buyer's infringement. 9 In Harper v. Shoppell,10 a
lower court decision, the defendant sold an uncopyrighted en-
graving of plaintiff newspaper's copyrighted picture to another
newspaper which used the plate to print the picture in its paper
in violation of the plaintiffs copyright. The federal circuit court
stated:
The cut was capable of use innocently in various ways having
no relation to the publication and sale of a newspaper. If the
defendant had sold the electrotype plate, intending or even ex-
pecting the purchasers to use it in competition with the plain-
tiff, he might be regarded as having sanctioned that use in ad-
88. This theory of vicarious liability differs from the previously discussed theory
requiring financial benefit and control. The previously discussed theory rests primarily on
the relationship of secondary actor to the principal actor, no sale of a tangible object is
involved. The theory this paragraph discusses is based upon the sale of a tangible object.
89. Kalem Co. v. Harper Bros., 222 U.S. 55, 62 (1911). Accord, Superior Oil Co. v.
Mississippi ex rel. Knox, 280 U.S. 390, 395 (1929).
90. 26 F. 519 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1886), rev'd on retrial, 28 F. 613 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1886).
At the second trial, the circuit court held the defendant liable because defendant knew
the buyer would use the plate to infringe plaintiff's copyright. The court, however, cited
the original opinion as controlling.
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vance, and consequently as occupying the position of a party
acting in concert with them and responsible with them as joint
tort-feasors.9 '
The court further stated the law should not assume the defendant
intended or expected the buyer to use the plate to infringe copy-
right even though the buyer was another newspaper.92 Harper
holds that even if the facts indicate the buyer may use the prod-
uct to infringe copyright, before the law will impose liability, the
seller must actually know at the time of sale this buyer will use
the product illegally.
Manufacturers of home videotaping systems are not vicari-
ously liable for copyright infringement under any of the accepted
tests. No lease or employment relationship exists between the
manufacturers and users, nor can manufacturers prevent pur-
chasers from using the machines in an infringing manner. The
relationship between the manufacturers and individual users,
therefore, is insufficient to impose liability. Additionally, the sale
of home videotape recording machines cannot support a finding
of liability because manufacturers do not intend that buyers use
the machines to infringe copyright. Courts should not infer that
manufacturers intend or encourage use of their machines in an
infringing manner unless the manufacturers actually know a par-
ticular buyer intends to use the machine to infringe copyright.9 3
Courts, therefore, should not impose liability merely because the
circumstances indicate the purchaser of a product capable of use
in a noninfringing manner94 intends to use the product to infringe
copyright . 5
Neither the 1909 Act nor the new copyright law adequately
protects copyright holders from home videotape recording. Indi-
viduals copying most copyrighted programs are liable for copy-
right infringement," but because discovering private copying is
difficult copyright holders cannot adequately protect their rights
by bringing actions against the copiers. Although copyright hold-
ers' most effective remedy under the 1909 Act and the new law is
91. 26 F. at 521.
92. Id.
93. See Harper v. Shoppell, 26 F. 519 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1886), rev'd on retrial, 28 F. 613
(C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1886).
94. See text accompanying notes 62-64 supra.
95. See Superior Oil Co. v. Mississippi ex rel. Knox, 280 U.S. 390, 395 (1926); Kalem
Co. v. Harper Bros., 222 U.S. 55, 62 (1911); Harper v. Shoppell, 26 F. 519, 521
(C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1886), rev'd on retrial, 28 F. 613 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1886).
96. See text accompanying notes 61-63 supra.
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to prevent distribution of the machines,97 they cannot prevent
distribution because manufacturers of home videotape recording
machines are not vicariously liable for copyright infringement. 8
The two laws, therefore, give copyright holders the exclusive right
to transcribe or copy their programs, but no effective means of
protecting that right.
It has been suggested those holding copyrights in television
broadcasts can adequately protect their interests by charging
more for the original broadcast of their programs." This increased
profit on the first run arguably cancels any loss the copyright
holders might suffer on subsequent broadcasts and retail market-
ing of the programs due to videotape copying. Although such a
remedy eliminates statutory copyright protection from videotape
recording and requires copyright holders to protect themselves, it
may have practical significance. For years people have copied
radio broadcasts of sound recordings, yet those creating sound
recordings do not seem to suffer a great deal.'00 Nor has such
copying noticably decreased the creation or marketing of soind
recordings. If home videotape copying affects holders of copy-
rights in television programs in a similar manner, a slight in-
crease in the price copyright holders charge for broadcasts of their
programs may adequately protect copyright holders' interests.
The West German system' of dealing with videotape copy-
ing of television broadcasts or recording of radio broadcasts, how-
ever, is more equitable. Under the West German system, the sale
price of recording equipment includes a royalty fee. Copyright
holders whose works are susceptible to copying by use of the
machines can, through an authors' society, force the machines'
manufacturers to pay the copyright holders a royalty. Although
the system presents problems of the amount of the royalty fee and
how to divide the fee, its adoption here would provide some com-
pensation to copyright holders. Such a remedy is certainly supe-
rior to the ineffective remedies United States copyright holders
now possess. Additionally, the system of royalty fees is more equi-
97. See text accompanying notes 67-72 supra.
98. See text accompanying notes 73-95 supra.
99. Needham, supra note 50, at 101.
100. In fact, when Congress passed the Sound Recording Amendment of 1971 (17
U.S.C. § 1(f) (Supp. 1975)), the House Report clearly stated the amendment was not
intended to prohibit private copying of copyrighted sound recordings. H.R. REP. No. 92-
487, 92d Cong., 1st Sess., reprinted in [1971] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 1566, 1572.
101. Art. 53(5) of the Law of Sept. 9, 1965, [1965] Bundesgesetzblatt [BGB1] 1 1273




table than having copyright holders increase the price they charge
for broadcasts of their programs because it forces those people
most likely to copy the programs to pay the damages such copy-
ing causes. Furthermore, the royalty system insures compensa-
tion for those copyright holders who cannot command a higher
price for their product.
Holders of copyrights in televised programs need more pro-
tection than the 1909 Act or the new copyright law provides.
Under both laws individuals copying televised programs for per-
sonal use are liable for copyright infringement in most instances,
yet copyright holders cannot protect their interests adequately by
pursuing the individual copiers. Copyright holders cannot pre-
vent distribution of home videotaping machines because machine
manufacturers and distributors are not vicariously liable for the
individual copier's infringement. Adoption of a royalty system
similar to West Germany's supplies copyright holders the needed
protection, while also allowing noninjurious fair uses. The system
would not only assure copyright holders adequate compensation
for any injury due to home videotaping, it would also force those
people most likely to cause the damage to pay the fee. In addi-
tion, by allowing continued use of home videotaping machines,
the system would permit fair uses of televised programs. The
royalty system, therefore, would effectuate statutory copyright's
purpose of encouraging the creation and spread of ideas by com-
pensating the copyright holder for injurious copying, while allow-
ing noninjurious copying, which does not interfere with the crea-
tion and spread of ideas, to continue.
James E. Reed
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